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FOREIGN AFFAIRS LAW AND DEMOCRACY 
Phillip R. Trimble* 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. By 
Louis Henkin. New York: Columbia University Press. 1990. Pp. 
viii, 125. $25. 
The Bush administration's preparations for war against Iraq set 
the stage for yet another debate over constitutional principle and pre-
rogative in conduct of American foreign relations. Although Congress 
eventually authorized the war, the basic constitutional questions were 
deferred, not resolved. The President continued to assert his authority 
unilaterally to engage in military action, 1 and continued to maintain 
that the War Powers Resolution was unconstitutional. The Congress 
disagreed on both counts, 2 and the courts declined to decide the is-
sues. 3 This controversy is only the most recent of many conflicts in 
recent years between the President, Congress, and Senate over the con-
duct of foreign affairs: the Iran-Contra scandal, the ABM Treaty rein-
terpretation, termination of the Taiwan Defense Treaty, bombing 
Tripoli, waging limited war in Grenada, Panama, and Nicaragua, de-
ploying armed forces to the Persian Gulf in the midst of the Iran-Iraq 
war, and numerous less publicized disputes.4 Each of these controver-
sies raised questions about the authority of the President, Congress, or 
Senate to take foreign-policy related action, independently or in defi-
ance of another branch. Because the courts traditionally have de-
clined to intercede, these controversies remain unresolved in principle, 
and are instead settled through the political process. Yet, in that pro-
• Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. B.A. 1958, Ohio University; 
M.A. 1959, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; LL.B. 1963, Harvard. - Ed. The author 
would like to thank his colleague, Dan Lowenstein, for his thoughtful comments on an earlier 
draft of this essay. 
1. See Excerpts From Bush's Remarks on Baker's Mission and Diplomacy's Fate, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 10, 1991, at A6, col. 4. The President's letter to congressional leaders asked for political 
support of the UN resolution, not legal authorization to use military force. See Bush '.s Letter to 
Congressional Leaders, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1991, at A6, col. 4. 
2. Biskupie, Constitutional Questions Remain, CoNG. Q., Jan. 12, 1990, at 70. 
3. The U.S. district courts dismissed actions brought by members of Congress and service-
men to curtail presidential authority. See Dellums v. Bush, No. 90-2866 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 1990) 
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (dismissing case on grounds that it was not yet ripe for deci-
sion). Pietsch v. Bush, No. 91-0132 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist 
File) (dismissing case by citzen for lack of standing); Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 
1990) (dismissing case by soldier called for Persian Gulf service on political question and ripeness 
grounds). 
4. For a survey and critique, see H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CoNSTITUTION 38-64 
(1990); M. GLENNON, CoNSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990). 
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cess, the issues are framed and debated as legal issues. To me the 
resulting debates are arcane and largely irrelevant. 
A standard form of argument is to invoke the constitutional text 
and inferences from it, and to look to the Founding Fathers (through 
the Philadelphia Convention, state ratifying conventions, English his-
tory and political theory, the Federalist Papers, and the actions of early 
Presidents and Congresses, where many of the founders were present). 
The use of Original Intent is often embellished with references to his-
torical practice and functional arguments appealing to the particular 
strengths of the President in carrying out foreign relations.5 It seems 
at least superficially anomalous that important twentieth-century is-
sues of constitutional power should be decided by references to eight-
eenth-century sources. This peculiarity is compounded when out-of-
context quotations are invoked by senators and presidents who are 
quite obviously making politically motivated decisions. 6 Debate 
framed in the terminology of Original Intent is not only hopelessly 
indeterminate, but also, and more importantly, disingenuous in a 
political forum. For me, it does not speak in terms that are important, 
meaningful, or relevant to the subject of the decision. 
In Constitutionalism, Democracy and Foreign Affairs, Louis Hen-
kin proposes a new way to resolve, or at least discuss, these issues. 
Pointing out that in 200 years the U.S. political system has changed 
from a "republic" to a "democracy," Henkin suggests that we should 
"fill [the Constitution's] gaps and interpret its ambiguities to satisfy 
better the elements of democracy as well as constitutionalism" (p. 15) 
and that, in foreign affairs law, we accordingly shape our constitu-
tional jurisprudence by reference to principles of democracy. 
Initially, Henkin's suggestion may seem hopelessly vague and inde-
terminate, akin to invoking "principles of freedom" or the "American 
way."7 Upon reflection, however, this approach has considerable ap-
peal because it may introduce a modem mode of analysis that speaks 
more honestly to the institutional issues involved. For example, at a 
minimum it would require an advocate to first specify her understand-
5. See, e.g .• CoNGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., TREATIES AND 
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 25-40 
(Comm. Print 1984); NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 7-50 (S. Dycus, A. Berney, w. Banks & P. 
Raven-Hansen eds. 1990); 1 UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 274-76, 298-305 (M. 
Glennon & T. Franck eds. 1980) (exchange of views between Senate Legislative Counsel and 
State Department Legal Advisor on the constitutionality of the Sinai Accords); Glennon, The 
Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REv. 109, 111 (1984). 
6. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE CoNGRESSIONAL CoMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-
CoNTRA AFFAIR, s. REP. 216, H.R. REP. 433, lOOTH CONG., lST SESS. 457-79 (1987) (Minority 
report). 
7. It also may be contradictory in that Henkin simultaneously proposes to use principles of 
constitutionalism. The principles of democracy may run counter to the commands of "constitu-
tionalism,'' which Henkin interprets to imply "limited government •.. subject to the rule of law 
.•• [and] fractionalized authority." P. 7. 
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ing of the meaning of "democracy," and thereby expound the values 
and interests that will be served by a particular line of argument or a 
conclusion that one branch or another should have the authority to 
take action. Introducing democratic theory into the debate is not 
likely to produce more determinacy in the law, nor to promote agree-
ment among political adversaries. Nevertheless, it promises to expose 
more clearly the values and interests at stake, and thereby contribute 
to a more meaningful debate of the issues, in Congress and in the pub-
lic forum. 
I. THE HENKIN CONTRIBUTION 
The Henkin book is an expansion of the Cooley Lectures delivered 
at the University of Michigan Law School. Henkin surveys the histor-
ical background of foreign affairs law, the perennial conflict between 
President and Congress, judicial abstention, and individual liberties. 
The book focuses especially on war and treatymaking, which have 
been the two principal sources of repeated controversy. 
Henkin first reviews the historical background and the traditional 
types of argument. As Henkin points out, "every argµment for extrap-
olation of authority for Congress from one of its expressed powers is 
countered by an argument for inferring power for the President from 
one of his powers" (p. 20). Moreover, "the text reveals no unambigu-
ous grand design .... [T]here is no compelling evidence of the intent of 
the framers, either as to the import of particular phrases as to grand 
design or as to many of the specific issues that agitate our constitu-
tional universe" (p. 21). In the case of war, text and original intent 
have succumbed to presidential authority asserted in response to prac-
tical circumstances. 
The evidence is that in the framers' contemplation, the armed forces 
would be under the command of the President but at the disposition of 
Congre8s. Principally, the President would command the forces in wars 
declared by Congress. As an exception, the framers agreed to leave to 
the executive "the power to repel sudden attacks": authorization by 
Congress might not be possible to obtain promptly, or at all, and could 
be assumed. There is no evidence that the Framers contemplated any 
significant independent role - or authority - for the President as Com-
mander in Chief when there was no war. [pp. 25-26; footnote omitted] 
Nevertheless, following Holmes, Henkin points out that "the life of 
the Constitution" (p. 26) has been experience and that Madison's orig-
inal view of the balance between Congress and the President has been 
supplanted by sweeping powers for the President that Hamilton would 
have preferred (p. 26). Henkin also calls attention to the functional 
justifications for a shift to presidential authority: 
Foreign policy, then as now, consisted of much more than making trea-
ties or legislating tariffs. Then as now, the conduct of foreign relations 
was a day-to-day process, continuous and informal. Unlike Congress, 
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dispersed during most of our early history in the distances of the coun-
try, the presidency was always "in session." Unlike Congress, which can 
act only formally, by statute or resolution (and therefore in effect only 
publicly and sometimes dramatically), the President can act quickly and 
informally, often discreetly or secretly . . . . [p. 27] 
And Congress has acquiesced: 
Congress contributed to the steady growth of presidential power. Con-
gress early recognized and confirmed the President's control of day-to-
day foreign intercourse, and the resulting monopoly of information and 
experience promoted presidential claims of expertise and a congressional 
sense of inadequacy. Congress generally acquiesced even in the Presi-
dent's deployment of forces, and the Senate in his executive agreements. 
Later, a growing practice of informal consultations between the Presi-
dent and congressional leaders disarmed them as well as members of 
Congress generally and helped confirm presidential authority to act 
without formal congressional participation. [p. 28] 
Recently Presidents have escalated their institutional claims. 
"Presidential authority to act when Congress has not is assumed; now 
it is claimed that presidential authority is supreme to or even exclusive 
of Congress" (p. 30). As Congress has become more assertive in pre-
scribing detailed limitations on executive branch conduct, the Presi-
dent has asserted the right to act in defiance of Congress. "The issue is 
no longer the President's power, but the power of Congress" (p. 30). 
The most conspicuous example is the War Powers Resolution. Hen-
kin observes: 
Mr. Nixon supported [his veto and] the conclusion that the War 
Powers Resolution was unconstitutional by the statement that the reso-
lution attempted "to take away ... authorities which the President has 
properly exercised under the Constitution for almost 200 years." But 
the President exercised those "authorities" during those 200 years when 
Congress was silent .... History supports few limitations on the power of 
Congress in foreign affairs other than the Bill of Rights, and history gives 
no support for any presidential authority to flout congressional legisla-
tion in the matters we are addressing. The President would have to find 
foreign affairs and Commander in Chief powers that give the President 
power exclusive of Congress, and there is little basis for that in text, 
original intent, or history. [pp. 30-31] 
Henkin's solution is that "[c]onstitutionalism and democracy ... 
should be invoked to resolve disputes and to guide the branches in the 
exercise of their allotted authority" (p. 36). According to this analy-
sis, issues of institutional authority should be examined in light of pro-
moting "maximum attention to the will of the people and the consent 
of all the governed" (p. 37). Henkin urges that, in the face of ambigu-
ity, "the principles and values of democracy may be determinative" (p. 
38). Unfortunately, Henkin is not very clear about his conception of 
democracy. Upon reflection it is at least not self-evident, as Henkin 
seems to assume, that Congress has a better claim to decisionmaking 
May 1991] Foreign Affairs Law 1375 
authority than the President, under the application of democratic 
principles and values. 
II. THE SEVERAL THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY 
One's choice among the many democratic theories will influence 
one's conclusion about which branch or combination of branches 
should have authority to take contested action, whether initiating war 
or concluding an international agreement. 
The simplest theory is that a democratic government either re-
flects, or should reflect, the preferences of "the people." Presumably 
the preference of the "people" is intended to mean a majority or plu-
rality of the people. Such an approach would be hopelessly simplistic 
and, as a descriptive theory, false and incoherent. In the U.S. foreign 
affairs law context, decisions may be made by one or some combina-
tion of four different bodies, the President, the Congress, the Senate, 
and the judiciary. The first three are elected, but from different seg-
ments of the "people." Consequently, excluding the judiciary, 8 the 
foreign policy process may involve three different "democracies" com-
peting for decisionmaking authority. 
In addition, whatever democracy means, it means more than a de-
cision by majority rule or preference of the people. First, decisions are 
made by representatives of the people, not by the people directly, and 
those representatives may or may not reflect the will of a majority (or 
plurality) of their constituents even if that will could be determined. 
Moreover, the representatives are not necessarily elected by a majority 
of their constituents. Democracy understood as decisionmaking ac-
cording to the "will of the people" does not well describe the Ameri-
can (or any large-scale) political system. 
Second, a decision rendered in the form of an act of Congress in-
volves at least three different formal steps in which the "people's" 
known preferences are weighed and processed: first, upon the election 
of a representative; second, when the representatives vote to produce a 
bill; and third, when a conference committee compromises between 
differing versions of the bill. During legislative deliberations the "will 
of the people" has several manifestations. 
In addition, an elected representative almost invariably has more 
than two choices, so that even if she could ascertain the preference of 
her constituents, a majority preference might not exist. Furthermore, 
a plurality preference may also be less popular than everyone's second 
choice, in which case the second choice arguably should prevail. Over 
time plurality preferences may also shift in response to tradeoffs 
among pluralities on different issues. As a descriptive theory, there-
8. Henkin argues for a more active role for the judiciary, which seems at odds with a more 
robust use of democratic principles to allocate decisionmaking authority. In this essay, however, 
I will only address the authority of the political branches. 
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fore, the idea of government simply reflecting the will of the people is 
insufficient. 
Henkin seems to follow this path, yet at the same time he also 
suggests that Congress is the most democratic branch. I would argue 
that, at least in foreign affairs, the President has the strongest claim to 
make decisions because the President is the only official who is elected 
by, and is in fact as well as in theory accountable to, the nationwide 
political community. In this regard, Henkin offers a rather peculiar 
observation: 
[O]urs is a unique, dual democracy, . . . . Both Congress and the Presi-
dent are representative; .•. both accountable. But their representative 
character and their accountability are different, and the differences 
should reflect and be reflected in their authority .... In foreign affairs, 
the President represents the people of the United States to the world. 
Congress represents the people at home, the different regions, groups, 
constituencies, and interests (general and special). . . . The presidency is 
confidential, classified; Congress is open and more accessible for citizen 
participation. Both are accountable, but the President's accountability is 
essentially plebiscitarian quadrennially. Congress - its members - are 
accountable directly, daily. [pp. 37-38] 
To the contrary, I believe the President represents the American 
people - all of them - at home as well as abroad. Moreover, some 
may feel that a true commitment to democratic principles would re-
quire representation in the decisionmaking process of all the people in 
the world whose welfare could be affected by the decision.9 From this 
perspective the President is the best representative. In making judg-
ments that affect both domestic and foreign spheres - increasingly the 
normal situation - the President is more likely to take account of 
foreign concerns than Congress. For example, presidential tendencies 
to balance foreign policy against domestic welfare in trade policy has 
more than once caused Congress to sharply restrict presidential discre-
tion in that area. To the extent that one is sympathetic to the idea that 
persons outside the United States directly affected by its actions 
should be represented in U.S. government decisionmaking under some 
form of democratic theory, one should favor more presidential author-
ity. As to accountability, it is unclear why a member of Congress is 
accountable "directly" but the President is not, nor why a Senator is 
accountable "daily" but the President is not. 
Some versions of democratic theory are very general and expressed 
at a high level of abstraction. For example, democracy may be con-
ceived as a process designed to assure maximum individual autonomy 
9. See, e.g., ALTERNATIVE SECURITY: LIVING WITHOUT DETERRENCE (B. Westin ed. 
1990). 
People in foreign states may of course be well represented by their own governments, which 
in turn seek to influence U.S. Government decisionmaking. But in a nonstate·centric view an 
argument can be made that purer democracy requires that the U.S. Government, or some part of 
it, should represent foreign people's views. 
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and equality, 10 or to achieve the "common good," "public interest," or 
"republican values." This framework seems far removed from foreign 
policy decisionmaking, but could be used to debate which political 
branch is more likely to achieve the preferred ends. Another approach 
would reject instrumental theories holding that democracy is a means 
to some good end, and instead would argue that democracy is itself the 
end so that popular participation should be enhanced.11 This ap-
proach may be applied fruitfully to foreign-policy decisionmaking, 
calling for processes such as referenda, increased use of local cable 
television, neighborhood meetings, and other devices to inform, coa-
lesce, and convey public opinion. As Benjamin Barber points out, 
"[T]he public at large has no specified constituency in America's [ex-
isting] pluralist politics."12 This approach, however, does not help de-
cide which political branch would be best equipped to process the 
fruits of enhanced public participation, so its relevance to separation of 
powers issues seems limited. Perhaps the most fruitful theoretical ap-
proach would draw upon the literature dealing with political 
pluralism. 
Any descriptive theory of American democracy must take account 
of interest groups.13 Even in an ideal democratic world, an elected 
representative must know the preferences of the people. Yet, as a 
practical matter, the wealthy and best organized segments of society 
can make their views more readily known, and therefore have a dis-
proportionate impact even on decisionmakers determined to carry out 
the will of the people. Moreover, decisionmakers seek reelection, 14 
and wealthy or well-organized groups can help directly in financing 
campaigns and mobilizing voters. 
One major theoretical approach to democratic theory portrays a 
political market in which politicians contend to gain election and, to 
that end, compete to produce public policy.15 In this analysis, small, 
highly organized interest groups may be particularly influential in get-
ting or preventing policy decisions that satisfy or deny their interests, 
even though the decision may be contrary to the interests of most peo-
ple.16 Public choice theory and the literature on political pluralism 
could be employed in dealing with foreign affairs law issues.17 Empiri-
cal research could show how interest groups influence in different 
10. R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRmcs 1 (1989). 
11. B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY xiv-xv (1984). 
12. Id. at 265. 
13. See generally K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (1986). 
14. See generally D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974). 
15. A. DOWNS, AN EcONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). 
16. See K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, supra note 13, at 87. 
17. See, e.g .• Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 873 
(1987). 
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ways, and to different degrees, the three quite different democracies 
involved - the President, the Congress, and the Senate. From empiri-
cal research and descriptive theory, one could devise propositions 
about the institutional characteristics of the political branches of gov-
ernment, the constituencies they represent, the interests most likely to 
be served, and the operation of the decisionmaking process. 
For example, of the three political institutions, members of the 
House of Representatives represent the smallest constituencies, and 
hence are more likely to be immediately responsive to local and grass-
roots interests. Biennial elections assure regular accountability; mem-
bers of the House should in theory most clearly represent the will of 
the majority or plurality of the people in their districts because they 
face reelection every two years. Congress, especially the House, may 
also be better positioned to know the views of citizens because its 
members are in close touch with constituents, and the constituency is 
smaller than the nation as a whole. On the other hand, Congress has 
no special claim to knowledge of the preferences of the unorganized, 
such as consumers or the poor. Moreover, a theory favoring a special 
role for Congress as applied to overall foreign policy, like issues of 
war, is weak because most politics are local - national issues are often 
absent from their campaigns - and most House members are regu-
larly reelected. Constituent service and careful attention to local is-
sues would seem more important to reelection than correct foreign 
policy.18 
Senators represent state-wide constituencies. Many of the interests 
that are powerful at a local level are similarly powerful at the state-
level. In heterogenous states, however, Senators may have to tradeoff 
interests of different constituencies, for example urban and rural, in 
more complex ways than members of the House. Consequently, nar-
row, local interests may be less well attended to in the Senate than in 
the House. Senators are more likely to be sensitive to matters that 
affect the state government or the state as a political entity. A Sena-
tor's six-year term should also permit a longer-term view of public 
policy, less beholden to electoral interests. 
The President must account to all the voters, and thus is likely to 
be responsive to highly organized, nationwide, well financed interests 
that can mobilize electoral support in the nationwide presidential cam-
paign. The President seems at least as likely as Congress to take ac-
count of the range of intensity and views of the unorganized. As noted 
above, the President is uniquely responsive to foreign interests, and the 
four-year term, coupled with the two-term limit, should permit a 
longer-term perspective on decisions taken. 
On the basis of this type of descriptive theory one could forge nor-
18. See D. MAYHEW, supra note 14, at 49-77. 
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mative arguments supporting or refuting the claims of Congress and 
the President for control of foreign policy. For example, in the mod-
em era trade agreements have been congressional-executive agree-
ments, in part because Congress has always established the tariffs that 
may be affected. The adjustment of tariff levels by international agree-
ment normally involves tradeoffs among sectors, regions, and localized 
interests. A trade agreement may reward wheat farmers but damage 
the mushroom industry. Congressional involvement assures that par-
ticipants in the process likely will be responsive to the localized inter-
ests affected, and permits maximum play of those interests. The 
congressional tradition of compromise may also assure that interests 
that lose in one agreement or in one session can be rewarded on some 
future occasion. It may seem appropriate, therefore, that trade agree-
ments and other agreements that involve matters already subject to 
elaborate legislation by Congress should be subjected to the same kind 
of bargaining and compromise. 
On the other hand, if one's preferred theory of democracy is that it 
is designed to assure the "common welfare," such as the economic 
interest of most people or the most economically efficient outcome, 
trade agreements should be concluded by the President alone (as was 
done in the cases of automobile and steel imports, in part to prevent a 
more protectionist, less economically efficient result dictated by 
Congress). 
As to the decision to go to war - there are good arguments, 
rooted in democratic theory, for presidential authority. Special inter-
ests (whether nationally or locally powerful) play less of a role; local, 
regional, or sectoral interests need not be compared and compromised; 
and economic factors do not normally seem paramount. Conse-
quently, Congress' particular ability to forge compromises among in-
terest groups, especially locally powerful groups, is not much involved 
in the decision to go to war, and thus do not support a special role for 
it. On the other hand, other factors suggest that the President has a 
stronger claim to make the final decision. The decision has a relatively 
nationwide impact, and affects foreign people as well. The President's 
constituency is nationwide, even worldwide. He is best positioned to 
weigh long-term consequences, international relations and interna-
tional law. To the extent that the "people's" immediate will can be 
known, and should control, the President can read polls as well as 
anyone. Moreover, the war question seems more likely to be a domi-
nant issue in a presidential campaign than in congressional races. 
Thus, accountability would be enhanced by placing the decisionmak-
ing authority in the hands of the President.19 
19. Of course, the countervailing principles of constitutionalism require a congressional role 
in the decision to go to war. However, it has played a role by authorizing armed forces, includ-
ing the rapid deployment force, in the face of known plans and commitments involving the use of 
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Henkin seems to believe that the Congress is better suited to satisfy 
democratic concerns. This seems dubious in light of the experience 
with the Iraq war. More frequent elections, and the resulting more 
sensitive accountability, may seem to suggest that the House (or Con-
gress) would be more reflective of popular will and for that reason the 
preferred arbiter of issues of war and peace. However, Congress be-
came concerned with the Iraq war issue only after the election, i.e., 
after the members were freed of immediate electoral accountability. 
Proposals to enhance the congressional role in foreign policy fail to 
take into account Congress' reluctance to play such a role. Even then 
the congressional leadership tried to avoid a vote, and when the votes 
were finally taken, immediately before an externally imposed deadline 
for action, several members voted in favor of war because of perceived 
need to support the President, not because they agreed with his policy. 
It is also not clear why the short-term popular will of the moment, 
even if Congress better reflects it, should prevail. Would the people 
have decided to go to war against Hitler absent Pearl Harbor? Finally, 
it may be that the decisionmaking process should make it particularly 
difficult to go to war, and, to that end, should require a congressional 
decision, but such a result does not seem justifiable in terms of notions 
of democracy. 
The major loser in an analysis resting on democratic principles is 
the Senate. The Senate has a weak claim to decisionmaking authority 
from the point of view of any notion of democratic theory. Its 
supermajority requirement in treatymaking gives a minority (one third 
plus one) of Senators the ability to veto a treaty. Minority power is 
enhanced by the potential use of the filibuster that can only be over-
come by another supermajority. Rural and conservative constituen-
cies are disproportionately favored by the composition of the Senate 
and can block agreements that are preferred by a national majority or 
that are desirable in the President's long-term view of the national in-
terest. The termination of the defense treaty with Taiwan illustrates 
the point in an analogous area. The President's decision to terminate 
the treaty and to proceed with the normalization of relations with 
China could have been frustrated by a minority of conservative Sena-
tors if a two-thirds vote of the Senate were required to terminate the 
treaty. If democracy means majoritarian preference, two thirds of the 
Senate has no role to play.20 
Historically, agreements dealing with the environment, invest-
ments, intellectual property, and arms control have been submitted to 
force in the Persian Gulf area. Moreover, the Senate consented to ratification of the United 
Nations Charter which contemplated use of force in situations like the Kuwait crisis. 
20. Henkin's counterbalancing appeal to constitutionalism does not seem to help to restore a 
senatorial role. Understood as a commitment to shared power among branches, the requirement 
of constitutionalism can be met by participation of the Congress. 
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the Senate. Today, however, many agreements in these areas are likely 
to affect the day-to-day affairs of local communities, so that foreign 
and domestic policies cannot readily be separated in many areas. For 
example, for decades investment treaties primarily helped U.S. corpo-
rations abroad. Today, foreign investment is becoming a major issue 
in the United States, and Congress has started to regulate it. In the 
face of congressional activity, it would now seem appropriate to con-
clude these agreements as congressional-executive agreements. 
Perhaps the Senate's article II modem role should focus on agree-
ments that deal with matters of special interest to the states as states, 
such as private international law treaties whose principal effect is to 
change state law, and perhaps some human rights treaties that, to the 
extent that any change in law is required, primarily affect state law 
(like the racial discrimination convention). 
Henkin endorses more House involvement and suggests that the 
House and Senate establish a committee to work out a division of au-
thority between article II treaties and congressional-executive agree-
ments (p. 67). However, such an exercise does not seem likely to be 
fruitful because it would require the Senate to look at these issues pri-
marily in terms of its article II prerogative in the abstract, divorced 
from the politics of particular agreements. It would be difficult for the 
Senate explicitly to agree to surrender authority not yet lost. Yet dem-
ocratic theory suggests more should be lost. Perhaps the more realis-
tic approach is for the President to take the initiative, with particular 
agreements, to push toward more congressional-executive agreements, 
as President Bush has done with the U.S.-Soviet Chemical Weapons 
Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
To elaborate how principles of democracy can help elucidate for-
eign affairs law, much work needs to be done. For each discreet issue 
we must articulate and choose an underlying theory, such as facilitat-
ing competition and compromise among interest groups, economic ef-
ficiency, citizen involvement in public policy issues, economic, social, 
or political equality, equality of opportunity or equality in fact, or in-
dividual autonomy and freedom. Then we can better analyze what 
distribution of authority would most likely achieve the chosen ends. 
The result will not be a more determinate foreign affairs law. There 
are many different democratic theories. Even agreement on a particu-
lar theory would not automatically yield a single conclusion. Never-
theless, pursuing the Henkin suggestion would add a new dimension to 
the traditional arguments and thereby enrich what has become a 
rather stale debate. 
